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STATE-INTEREST ANALYSIS AND THE 
·CHANNELLING FUNCTION IN FAMILY LA Wt 
Carl E. Schneider* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I want to develop some themes I advanced in my article entitled 
State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: 
An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social /ssues. 1 In that arti-
cle I noted that while courts and commentators have lavished effort 
on the fundamental-rights side of privacy law, they have scanted the 
state-interest side, thereby producing crucial weaknesses in that law.2 
I felt that state~interest discussions in privacy cases often seemed to 
me unsatisfying. This is an attempt to see why. 
A major difficulty is that states tend to advance and courts tend to 
accept quite narrow specifications of a statute's purpose. I believe, 
however, that often particular statutes are part of a larger framework 
of laws serving some relatively broad purposes. More generally, "the 
Court often looks at the particular situation a case presents in isola-
tion from its legal and social context and often looks at the chal-
lenged statute in isolation from other statutes and from other forms 
of social regulation. "3 
Here, I consider another interest that is part of that context. I do 
so by examining further the law's work in building and sustaining 
social institutions. Briefly, I suggest that that work, which I call the 
"chap.nelling function," may often be advanced as part of a state's 
interest in statutes challenged on privacy grounds. I do not argue 
that such an interest will always be present or that it must always 
prevail. I do argue that it is an often ignored, but often legitimate, 
aspect of a statute's goal and of a state's interests. 
t © 1992 by Carl E. Schneider. These remarks were based on a paper prepared for the 
Conference on Compelling Government Interests at Albany Law School, September 26-28, 
1991. The full paper, on which these remarks were based, is scheduled to appear in a volume 
tentatively entitled Compelling Government Interests: The Mystery of Constitutional 
Analysis (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed.) to be published by the University of Michigan Press. · 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
' 51 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at 79. 
• See id. at 82-96. 
3 /d. at 97. 
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Finally, a word about the scope of my remarks. One might ask two 
basic questions about the channelling function. The first is whether 
its use is wise social policy. The second is whether it may properly be 
adduced as a state interest to justify a law challenged on privacy 
grounds. I address only the second question. Channelling can be used 
for multiple ends. I will discuss the most typical and perhaps the 
hardest case, namely, the version of the channelling function that 
could have been most plausibly advanced in recent privacy cases. I 
am not arguing that any use of the channelling function constitutes 
by itself a compelling state interest or even that all its forms ~nd 
features are desirable. For one thing, it is very hard to know what a 
compelling state interest is, and the Court has been reasonably 
closed-mouthed about telling us. 
Finally, I end the beginning with a confession. In the years be-
tween the time Professor Stephen Gottlieb asked me to participate in 
this conference and today, I have lost interest to an embarrassing ex-
tent in the constitutional questions that I will be address-
ing-questions that increasingly seem to me stale, flat, and unprofit-
able-and find myself instead interested in the channelling 
functions's role in family law. 
II. THE THEORY OF THE CHANNELLING FUNCTION 
A. Defining the Channelling Function 
The law performs the channelling function by creating, or more 
often, supporting social institutions that are thought to promote de-
sirable ends. I intend "social institution" broadly: "In its formal soci-
ological definition, an institution is a pattern of expected action of 
indiviquals or groups enforced by social sanctions, both positive and 
negative."• Generally, the channelling function does not require that 
people use social institutions, although it may offer incentives and 
disincentives for their use. Primarily, rather, it is their very presence, 
the social currency they have, and the governmental support they re-
ceive that combine to make it seem reasonable and even natural for 
people to use them. Thus, people can be said to be channelled into 
them. As Berger and Luckmann write, "Institutions ... , by the very 
fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up 
predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as 
against the many other directions that would theoretically be pos-
• RoBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE Gooo SociETY 10 (1991). 
1992] The Chanelling Function in Family Law 671 
sible."& Or, as James Fitzjames Stephen wrote, "The life of the great 
mass of men, to a great extent the life of all men, is like a water-
course guided this way or that by a system of dams, sluices, weirs, 
and embankments. . . . [l]t is by these works-that is to say, by their 
various customs and institutions---:-that men's lives are regulated."8 
With what institutions has family law been concerned? Most obvi-
. ously with "the family." However, that term has grown so broad and 
vague that we will treat two more specific institutions: marriage and 
parenthood. Each of these terms, to be sure, itself needs narrowing. 
To do so, we will first consult current social understandings. Second, 
we will narrow our terms by asking what social arrangements the law 
evidently seeks to promote. 
Applying those tests yields a normative mode of "marriage" with 
several fundamental characteristics. It is monogamous, heterosexual, 
and permanent. It rests on love. Husbands and wives are expected to 
treat each other affectionately, considerately, and fairly. They are to 
be animated by mutual concern and willing to sacrifice for each 
other. 
On the same tests, the institution of parenthood has several key 
normative characteristics. Parents should be married to each other. 
They are preferably the biological father and mother of the child. 
They have authority over their children and can make decisions for 
them. Like spouses, parents are expected to love their children and to 
be affectionate, considerate and fair. They must support their chil-
dren during their minority. They should try to assure them a stable 
home. In particular, they should stay married to each other, so that 
the child lives with both parents. 
Obviously, these two normative models are not and never were de-
scriptions of any universal empirical reality, and soon I will examine 
recent changes in social practices and ideals that affect these models. 
Nor are these models the only ones the channelling function might be 
recruited to serve. Nevertheless, they do describe ideals that have 
had long and substantial allegiance in American life and that have 
animated the law. But how has the law tried to support these two 
institutions and to channel people into them? A quick and partial 
sketch should show more concretely how channelling works. 
The law long ago (I am using a somewhat archaic version of em-
phasis) set a framework of rules designed to shape and sustain the 
0 PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREA-
TISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 52 (1966). 
• JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 63-64 (R.J. White ed., 1967). 
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model of marriage I described above: It wrote standards for entry 
into marriage, standards that prohibited polygamous, incestuous, and 
homosexual unions. It sought to encourage permanence in marriage 
by inhibiting divorce. It tried to promote desirable marital behavior 
both directly and indirectly. It imposed a few direct obligations dur-
ing marriage, like the duty of support. Less directly, it invented spe-
cial categories of property (like tenancies by the entirety and rights 
of dower and curtesy) to reflect the special relationship of marriage. 
It indirectly set some standards for marital behavior through the law 
of divorce. Fault-based divorce law did so by describing behavior so 
seriously wrong that it justified divorce. Marital-property law implic- · 
itly set standards for the financial conduct of spouses.· Finally, 
prohibititions against nonmarital sexual activity and against quasi-. 
marital arrangements in principle confined sexual life to marriage. 
"What is all this," James Fitzjames Stephen once asked, "except the 
expression of the strongest possible determination on the part of the 
Legislature to recognize, maintain, and favour marriage in every pos-
sible manner as the foundation of civilized society?"7 
Similarly, a framework of laws endeavored to shape and sustain the 
institution of parenthood. Laws criminalizing fornication, cohabita-
tion, adultery, and bigamy in principle limited parenthood to married 
couples, and laws disadvantaging illegitimate children made it wise to 
confine parenthood to marriage. Laws restricting divorce made it 
likelier that a child would continue to live with both parents. The law 
buttressed parents' authority in a variety of ways. For example, 
parents could use reasonable force in disciplining their children. 
They could decide whether their children should have medical treat- . 
ment. Parents of "children in need of supervision" could recruit the 
state's coercive power. However, the law also attempted, directly and 
indirectly, to influence parental behavior. It required parents to sup-
port their children. It penalized the "abuse" or "neglect" of children 
and obliged many people to report evidence of any such behavior. It 
made parents send their children to school. Less directly, the law of 
child custody set some standards for parental behavior and empha-
sized the primacy of children's interests. Finally, some states further 
elaborated the relationship between parent and child by requiring . 
adult children to support their indigent parents. 
This sketch suggests some further comments on the channelling 
function. First, it has two aspects. In one aspect, it creates (or, more 
often) recruits an institution and attempts to shape and sustain its 
7 /d. at 156. 
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nature. In the other, it seeks to channel people into that institution. 
It can perform these two tasks in several ways. First, it does so sim-
ply by recognizing and endorsing them. Thus institutions may be 
given some aura of legitimacy and permanence. Legal recognition 
may be extended by setting up formalized, routinized, and regulated 
entry and exit to an institution, as the state has done with mar-
riage-i.e., "By the authority vested in me by the State of Michigan, 
I now pronounce you man and wife." And, as I said earlier, the very 
currency and presence of these institutions to some extent channels 
people into them. 
But mere governmental recognition may little affect an institution 
or an individual. A second channelling technique is to reward partici-
pation in an institution. Tax law, for instance, may offer bene-
fits-like the marital deduction-to married couples that are unavail-
able to the unmarried. Similarly, Social Security law provides 
benefits to spouses it will not provide lovers. In a somewhat different 
vein, the law of alimony and marital property offers spouses the ad-
vantage of protection on divorce. 
Third, the law can channel by discouraging the use of competing 
institutions. Sometimes competitors are flatly outlawed, as by laws 
prohibiting sodomy, bigamy, or adultery. Sometimes competing insti-
tutions are disadvantaged. For instance, the rule making contracts 
for meretricious consideration unenforceable traditionally denied un-
married couples the law's help in resolving some disputes. Similarly, 
nonparents are presumptively disadvantaged in custody disputes 
with parents. Finally, restrictive divorce laws impede reentry into the 
alternative institution of single life. 
Fourth, in principle people could be channelled into an institution 
by directly penalizing its nonuse. One might, for instance, say that 
school taxes penalize not having children, since nonparents get less 
out of those taxes than parents. However, the weakness of this exam-
ple suggests the difficulty of finding good instances in American law 
of direct penalties for not marrying or not having children. 
By and large, then, the channelling function does not rely primar-
ily on direct legal coercion. People are not forced to marry. One can 
contract out, formally or informally, of many of the rules underlying 
marriage. One need not have children, and one cannot be forced to 
treat them well. Rather, the function shapes an institution that has 
broad social support and that comes to seem so natural that people 
use it almost unreflectively. It relies centrally on social approval of 
the institution, on social rewards for its use, and on social disfavor of 
its alternative. 
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B. What Purposes Does the Channelling Function Serve? 
The channelling function's primary purpose I have said, is to foster 
social institutions and to channel people into them. But why might 
the state want to do so? Similarly, family law's channelling function 
is partly a specialized way of performing the protective, facilitative, 
and arbitral function. For instance, marriage variously serves the pro-
tective function. Law does not just (in conjunction with other social 
forces) create a shell of an institution; it creates (again with much 
help) institutions with norms. The institution of marriage, which the 
law recruits and shapes, attempts to induce i~ spouses a sense of an 
obligation to treat each other well-to love and honor each other. At 
the elemental level of physical violence, the law has tried to buttress 
this socially-imposed obligation by criminalizing, and (increasingly in 
some jurisdictions) aggressively prosecuting spouse abuse, by making 
cruelty a ground for divorce, and by taking cruelty into account in 
settling the spouses' economic affairs. At the level of economic life, 
the law has (at least nominally) supervised the fairness of antenuptial 
agreements and the distribution· of the spouses' assets on divorce. 
More subtly, these institutions also serve what I have called "effi-
ciency" functions (but that 'might in this warmer context be called 
"ways of easing social life"). First, the channelling function's institu-
tions save people from having to invent the forms of family life de 
novo. Imagine two nineteen-year olds living in a state of nature who 
find themselves in love. Without established social institutions, they 
would have to work out for themselv'es how to express that love, how 
to structure their relationship, and what expectations they might rea-
sonably have of each other. The same couple in, say, the United 
States in the mid-twentieth century would find a set of answers to 
those questions in the institution of marriage. They would see other 
answers presented by other institutions. They would hear criticisms 
of marriage. They would not be compelled to marry. But, if their re-
lationship met the requirements of marriage, marriage would seem 
natural to them because most of the adults they knew partook of it, 
because society and the law supported it, and because they had to 
some extent internalized its values. The institution, in other words, 
would be part of a readily accessible social vqcabulary. 
The channelling function does not just relieve people of the burden 
of working out afresh how to organize their lives. Even if one could 
satisfactorily invent modes of living for oneself, they probably could 
not be lived alone, but would be lived with others. This suggests that 
people need to understand and predict what other people think and 
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do so that they can readily and safely interact and cooperate with 
each other. Social institutions help meet that need. As Martin 
Krygier writes, "There are many social situations where our decisions 
are strategically interdependent [with the decisions of other people] 
. . . . [l]n such situations, norms will be generated which provide 
'some anchorage; some preeminently conspicuous indication as to 
what action is likely to be taken by (most of) the others. . . . ' "8 So-
cial institutions and the norms that they create, then, help people 
predict and thus count on, cope with, and cooperate with other 
people. 
More concretely, for example, the institution of marriage helps 
people plan for the future even before becoming engaged and reach 
easier understandings with their fiances and spouses about their mar-
ried lives. People dealing with spouses benefit as well. On the most 
mundane level, they know that when they say, "Can you come to din-
ner on the sixteenth?" the invitation will be taken as including both 
husband and wife. Less banally and more consequentially, a wedding 
ring warns anyone attracted to its wearer not to contemplate an inti-
mate relationship. 
The advantages of institutions in family life are vividly revealed by 
situations in which institutions are absent. Andrew Cherlin describes 
the difficulties for remarried adults and their children whose 
day-to-day life includes many problems for which there are no 
institutionalized solutions. These problems can range from de-
ciding what a stepchild should call his or her stepparent, to 
resolving the sexual tensions that can emerge between step-
relatives in the absence of a well-defined incest taboo, to de-
fining the financial obligations of husbands to their spouses 
and children from current and previous marriages. 9 
Nor are these failures of institutionalization easily overcome. David 
Chambers writes that "the relationship between many stepparents 
and stepchildren remains unclear and uncomfortable well beyond the 
initial stages. "10 
We can summarize these workings of the channelling function by 
imagining two people looking for recreation, who live in a world with-
out tennis, and who are given three balls, two racquets, and one net. 
, 
8 Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 258-59 (1986) (quoting EDNA ULL-
MANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 109 (1977)). 
9 ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 87-88 (1981). 
10 David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of "Fam-
ily" after Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102, 106 (Stephen D. Sugarman & 
Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). 
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They could no doubt find some way of amusing themselves with 
these toys. But tennis is a good game partly because it developed 
over many centuries, and the two could not easily invent as good a 
game. Further, where tennis is a social institution, the two will read-
ily find people with whom to enjoy their recreation, to improve their 
game, to boast of their successes, and to lament their failures. And 
part of the pleasure of tennis lies in knowing its past glories and fol-
lowing its current progress. Tennis, in other words, succeeds because 
it is a well-developed, well-established, and widely shared social insti-
tution. Marriage and parenthood benefit from that same fact. 
My time is now expiring, and, as an advocate of social institutions, 
I feel obligated to stay within the rules. I do want to say one last 
thing, however. It will surely have occurred to you that there are 
some difficulties with the operation of the channelling function. A 
large part of my paper is given over to those difficulties. Let me just 
suggest to you very briefly what a few of those difficulties are. 
The first difficulty, it seems to me, is that there is a serious ques-
tion about whether the channelling function works. One of the most 
interesting bodies of literature in legal scholarship today is one whose 
real purpose seems to be to show that law ·makes hardly any differ-
ence in the world at all. I am thinking, of course, of Stewart Macau-
lay's work on contracts, 11 and of Robert Ellickson's work on the 
ranchers in Shasta County.12 There is, in other words, a real question 
about the extent to which legal institutions actually affect people in 
the way tl:\ey live their daily liv:es, especially when you consider how 
many other things more pressing and immediate are likely to impinge 
on people. 
The second difficulty with the channelling technique is that it has 
obvious costs. When you disadvantage competing institutions, you 
are imposing costs on people who would like to use those institutions. 
There is a good deal of variation among different kinds of channel-
ling situations that will in turn cause a good deal of variation in the 
cost of the channelling function. I think it is clear that there will be 
situations in which those costs are too high. 
A third problem with the channelling technique is the possibility 
that social change has passed at least some versions of the channel-
ling function by and that any attempt to restore something like the 
11 See,· e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). 
" See RoBERT C. ELLJCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986). 
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status quo ante is doomed to failure. Let me just say, once ·again, that 
the example I have used to illustrate the channelling function is not 
the only purpose to which the channelling function could be put. My 
own suspicion is that the channelling function is now being used in a 
very different sort of way to try to reshape the relationships between 
men and women within marriages. 
Fourth, it seems to me that the attraction of the channelling func-
tion depends considerably on what goals that function is set to pur-
sue. This, like any other function, can be put to unpleasant purposes, 
and then it will be an unpleasant function. And the last question, of 
course, is whether the state should try to prescribe institutions for 
people to live in at all. 
